Democratic Governability in Colombia: An Overview of Institutional, Electoral, Economic, and Security Aspects

Colombia’s modern paradox lies in its resilient formal democracy, contrasted with deep-rooted structural instability. This can be understood by examining how presidential authority, ongoing political party fragmentation, distorted economic policies, flawed electoral systems, and the growth of transnational crime collectively influence democratic governance.[1] Scholars indicate that the country’s stability is increasingly threatened not by traditional coups, but through a complex form of “democratic delinquency” – where criminal-political alliances intentionally undermine local state capacity to defend and pursue illegal interests.[2] Power vacuums compound this issue following peace agreements, the rise of transnational organized crime (TOC), and systemic failures in regional governance.[3] 

I.     Institutional and Political Resilience: Exploring the Dynamics of Presidential Power

Colombia’s institutional framework has shown remarkable resilience over decades of violence, especially when compared to its regional neighbors.[4] Despite this strength, the system remains structurally vulnerable to executive overreach and is particularly fragile at the local level.

A.   The Fragile Constitutional Heritage and Decentralization

Colombia’s democratic progress persists in written laws despite persistent violence and social exclusion.[5] The 1991 Constitution and reforms such as direct mayoral elections aimed to decentralize authority and boost local political engagement.[6] Ironically, the decentralization measures unintentionally provided paramilitary groups with a target at the national level, enabling armed factions to manipulate local offices for illegal purposes and seize institutional control.[7]

While these institutional changes establish a base for local capture, the judiciary at the national level has played a crucial counterbalance. The independent Constitutional Court (CC) consistently acts as an essential check on executive overreach, limiting presidential power in ways that are often not seen in other Latin American countries.[8]

B.    Presidential Hegemony and the Threat of Delegative Democracy

Colombia operates under a presidential system in which authority is concentrated in the executive branch. Scholars describe this as presidential hegemony – the president’s capacity to influence other institutions such as the legislature and judiciary – which they consider a key factor that can lead to democracy instability and heighten the risk of democratic collapse.[9]

This concentration of power underpins a regime known as delegative democracy (DD). In DD, the elected president is viewed as having broad authority to govern as they wish, constrained only by existing power structures and a fixed constitutional term.[10] The president often symbolizes the nation, while horizontal accountability to bodies like the legislature or judiciary remains weak, enabling unilateral actions by the executive. This can manifest as decision-making frenzy or decretismo (rule by decree).[11] Although DD regimes conduct free and fair elections, the absence of crucial institutional checks – hallmarks of liberal democracy – poses ongoing risks to democratic stability.[12]

C.   The Institutional Veto: Limiting Executive Overreach

Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s presidency (2002–2010) highlights the clash between populist appeal and institutional boundaries.[13] Capitalizing on his strong popularity, driven by his assertive security policy (Democratic Security), Uribe sought constitutional reforms to prolong his tenure.[14] This populist approach capitalized on early 2000s security crises, enabling him to sidestep in-depth economic debates and brand critics as “enemies of the state” or accomplices of terrorists.[15]

Uribe’s efforts to promote several constitutional amendments, such as prolonging presidential terms, resembled strategies used by other leaders with hegemonic ambitions, like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.[16] However, Colombia markedly differed from Venezuela’s decline into democratic erosion because of the strategic opposition response and the judiciary’s sustained strength.[17]

The Colombian opposition mainly used an institutional strategy, aiming for moderate goals such as delaying and altering reforms instead of the radical, outside-the-system goal of removing the president.[18] This approach involved:

1.     Legislative Obstruction: Using procedural challenges, roll-call votes, and complex committee debates to delay key bills such as the Referendum against Bad Politics and Corruption and the Reelection Referendum, often prolonging approvals for months.[19] These delays provided opportunities for corruption scandals to surface, harming the president’s reputation and bolstering the opposition.[20]

2.     Judicial Review: Opponents thoroughly recorded procedural irregularities during congressional debates, supplying the Constitutional Court with the legal basis to invalidate certain parts of the laws based on their design or procedure.[21] The CC effectively stopped major elements of Uribe’s agenda, such as the bid for a third term, reaffirming its crucial role in safeguarding the constitutional order.[22]

Meanwhile, the Venezuelan opposition used radical extra-institutional tactics against Hugo Chávez, such as a coup attempt in 2002, a general strike in 2003, and an electoral boycott in 2005.[23] These actions failed and instead provided Chávez with the political legitimacy to suppress opposition leaders and implement more aggressive reforms, which ultimately eroded checks and balances and pushed the country further toward competitive authoritarianism.[24]

Colombia’s moderate institutional opposition strategy demonstrated that democracy’s decline is not inevitable, even under a popular leader.[25] The CC’s decisions, notably the 2010 ruling that prevented Uribe from running for a third term, played a key role in rebuilding public trust in democratic institutions. This shift showed that these institutions “could, should, and would matter in the future,” thus disrupting the expected cycle of institutional weakening forecasted by the DD model.[26]

II.   The Political Economy of Democratic Delinquency

Colombia’s democracy quality is deeply tied to its political economy, characterized by significant regional disparities, insufficient governance reforms, and a crucial connection between crime, politics, and fiscal resources.

A.   The Failure of “Good Governance”

Standardized explanations of “good governance,” often advocated for international organizations, claim that setting rules to secure property rights, transparency, and the rule of law are both necessary and sufficient for promoting economic growth.[27] However, this perspective neglects subnational economic development by failing to consider geography-specific analyses of local power dynamics and deeply rooted elite interests.[28]

In Colombia, empirical evidence shows that since the 1980s, structural reforms and decentralization have increased, rather than decreased, regional economic disparities.[29] To close this gap, research advocates for adopting a place-based political economy approach that considers historical power structures, local elite interests, and informal institutions affecting policy enforcement at the local level.[30] In many deprived Colombian municipalities, local governance tends to be exclusionary and frequently functions as subnational authoritarianism, unofficially weakening democratic processes.[31]

B.    Strategic Weakening of the State and Influence of Paramilitary Groups

Democratic stability is mainly undermined by strategic state weakening, where politicians and criminal actors intentionally weaken local institutions for mutual financial and political gains.[32] This pattern is evident in the governance of mayors associated with paramilitary groups who rose to power following the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).[33]

In 2007, analyses of tightly contested mayoral elections showed that when a paramilitary-friendly party secured victory, property taxes decreased notably, by about 0.69 standard deviations.[34] Importantly, this decrease in the state’s ability to extract resources continued even after the paramilitary-affiliated mayor left office, indicating that criminal influence endures through political successors and systemic institutional harm.[35]

This weakening is a deliberate political choice. Politicians and their criminal allies intentionally slow down investments in property rights institutions, like outdated cadastral records, and hinder efficient collection processes. This strategy helps them amass wealth and political influence while maintaining impunity.[36] The success of these mayors is also associated with reduced local judicial effectiveness, evidenced by an 8% increase in complaints against officials.[37]

C.   Fiscal Management and the Resource Curse

The structure of municipal financing greatly influences local democratic performance and corruption risks. Research comparing various revenue sources shows that the fiscal source is a key factor:

1.     Local taxes collected at the municipal level are linked to improved government performance in delivering key public services like education, health, and water. Mayors who rely more heavily on local taxes generally make more effective investments in human capital development.[38]

2.     Natural Resource Royalties (Rents): These transfers often act as windfalls, and municipalities with substantial royalty revenues tend to have a higher incidence of mayoral misconduct and corruption-related crimes.[39]

The key distinction is in how accountability is structured. Local taxes, such as property taxes, require local authorities to collect them and establish a direct link between the government and citizens.[40] On the other hand, resource rents are unearned income from external sources, thereby decoupling administrative effort from the government’s fiscal capacity. This separation can tempt public officials to seize public funds instead of providing services.[41]

D. Illicit Finance and the Integrity of Democracy

Illegal campaign financing extends beyond municipal revenues, posing a systemic threat to democratic integrity at the national level.[42] The expansion of criminal-political networks, clientelism, and party fragmentation – further exacerbated by lax public financing rules – enables the capture of state resources and personnel.[43] This financial influence can distort democratic processes significantly, especially in Latin America, where weak regulations lead to high volatility and external interference.[44] To effectively regulate campaign finance, it is necessary to shift from strict, difficult-to-enforce rules like rigid spending caps toward establishing consensus among opposition parties.[45]

III. Electoral Dynamics, Violence, and Information Wars

Democratic governance in Colombia faces ongoing challenges due to the interaction of armed groups, electoral processes, and public opinion manipulation. This indicates a move away from widespread violence toward focused political repression.

A.   The Importance of Electoral Management and Integrity

The procedural quality of elections in Latin America fundamentally depends on the independence of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs). Studies show that professional and autonomous electoral commissions significantly contribute to better electoral outcomes, boosting the chances of legitimate elections by around 50%.[46] Independent EMBs, untainted by partisan influence, are crucial for ensuring credible elections, especially in democratizing nations marked by high distrust and limited state administrative capacity.[47] On the other hand, elections managed by partisan or single-party-dominant EMBs are far more prone to flawed or unacceptable results.[48] Moreover, the likelihood of unacceptable elections rises considerably when incumbents or their parties are involved, reflecting their strong incentive to manipulate the process.[49]

B.    Local Competitive Authoritarianism and Targeted Repression

Though the official war with the FARC concluded in 2016, the assassination of social leaders has emerged as a significant form of violence post-conflict. This violence is not random or purely criminal; it is deeply political and motivated by entrenched local elites who aim to maintain local competitive authoritarian regimes.[50]

Violence predominantly occurs in municipalities characterized by limited electoral competition, moderate party fragmentation, and low voter turnout.[51] This form of local authoritarianism is challenged by bottom-up mobilization, particularly by sociopolitical actors supporting the peace agreement and leftist parties.[52] When such credible threats arise, local elites and their allies often respond with lethal violence to suppress anti-elite groups, hinder their political influence, and maintain their exclusionary rule.[53] This approach, which involves informal violence and coercion within democratic spaces, highlights the significance of local political structures in post-conflict violence – supporting explanations that emphasize their role alongside illegal armed groups and illicit economies.[54]

C.   Digital Communication and Emotional Polarization

The political debate about the peace process and elections is strongly influenced by digital communication and affective polarization – the heightened negative emotions directed at political opponents.[55]

An analysis of social media activity on Twitter/X during the 2022 presidential campaign shows that discourse among political elites influences how citizens feel.[56] Tweets from elites about the peace process tend to have a more intense emotional tone and are more frequently retweeted when they express negative emotions like anger or fear, discuss controversial topics, or oppose certain views.[57] This indicates that emotional expression and partisan disagreements online play a key role in political mobilization and communication strategies.[58]

D. The Politics of Information in Direct Democracy

In direct-democracy contexts such as the 2016 peace referendum, how information is conveyed significantly affects voting choices, particularly among voters with limited understanding.[59] The campaign was described as a “battle of narratives” between supporters (championing opportunity and peace) and opponents (highlighting risks and impunity).[60]

Experimental research showed that messages emphasizing opportunity – namely, the benefits of the deal – increased support for “Yes” by about 30 percentage points among low-knowledge voters.[61] In contrast, risk-focused messages, which highlighted FARC impunity or political involvement, did not significantly influence persuasion, although they did result in longer information processing times.[62] This likely occurred because risk-based arguments are seen as more complex and less convincing. These findings highlight the vulnerability of direct democracy when public knowledge is limited, especially since low-knowledge voters are more susceptible to simple, positively framed messages.[63]

IV. Security Challenges, Transnational Crime, and the Border Connection

Colombia’s ongoing instability is directly linked to the continued existence of non-state armed groups, open borders that enable criminal activities, and the breakdown of government authority in remote areas.

A.   State Weakening, ALSs, and Environmental Crime

The effects of a weakened state are most evident in Areas of Limited Statehood (ALSs), where the government either lacks the capacity or the political will to deliver essential services and enforce the rule of law.[64] This ‘democratic delinquency’ that weakens local taxation also allows organized crime to flourish in these peripheral regions.[65]

Post-conflict shifts have redirected criminal economies’ focus. In areas with weak government influence, environmental harm and illegal land use are more often tied to criminal profits.[66] While coca cultivation is commonly highlighted, illegal cattle ranching actually drives most deforestation in post-conflict Colombia, linking environmental crime directly to the financial interests of criminal and political groups engaged in land speculation.[67] To address this, it is crucial to redirect financial incentives from resource extraction to strong land governance and taxation, aiming to reduce these illegal activities unrelated to coca.[68]

B.    External Spillovers: The Venezuela Link

The challenges of ALSs are worsened by instability in nearby countries, especially Venezuela, which has shifted from a democracy to a “mafia-state.”[69] The Venezuelan government does not just passively exist alongside organized crime; it actively offers protection, support, and helps facilitate the activities of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), like the Tren de Aragua megabanda.[70]

This state-criminal symbiosis fuels illegal flows – contraband, people, and weapons – that enter Colombia, especially along the 1,378-mile porous border.[71] Border cities like Cúcuta become contested urban areas where security threats such as gang crime and extortion overlap with insurgent and paramilitary violence tied to territorial disputes over trafficking routes.[72] These blurred lines between legal and illegal economies make Colombian border regions unstable, as local authorities focus on national security but often overlook the competing local authoritarianisms fueling violence.[73] To dismantle TCOs effectively, political will, strong state capacity, and robust international cooperation are essential, particularly between Colombia and Venezuela, which remains challenging due to strained diplomatic ties.[74]

C.   Migration and Societal Tensions

The massive influx of Venezuelan nationals in Colombia, fueled by Venezuela’s economic decline and security issues, creates significant humanitarian and governance challenges.[75] The administration of Juan Manuel Santos and Iván Duque developed a strategic humanitarian narrative – highlighting brotherhood, moral responsibility, and potential long-term economic benefits like possible GDP growth – to support the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) program.[76]

Despite the positive narrative, there’s a growing gap with public perception. More people now associate migrants with increased crime, violence, and insecurity, diverging from the official humanitarian stance.[77] Media reports often link Venezuela and migration to crime, reinforcing fears that migrants worsen public safety.[78] This disconnect between government messaging and public opinion highlights the difficulty in garnering widespread support for inclusive policies, especially when there’s a belief that local resources and security are overwhelmed.[79]

V. Strategic Governance, Technology, and Policy Pathways

Despite persistent fundamental challenges, Colombia is utilizing institutional innovation – especially in technology and strategic communication – to strengthen accountability and governance.

A.   Digital Governance Frameworks and Policy Coordination

Colombia’s e-government strategy, exemplified by the Gobierno en Línea (Online Government) initiative, highlights the difficulties of deploying technological solutions amid a highly politicized setting.[80] The initiative exposes three interconnected patterns of governance:

1.     Idealist: Emphasizes aspirational goals like transparency, efficiency, and citizen engagement, often mirroring "new public management” approaches from Western nations.[81]

2.     Strategic: Focuses on specifying service outputs and performance metrics to track policy enforcement.[82]

3.     Power-Based: Acknowledges that e-government naturally stems from existing power structures and traditions, like centralized government, internal conflicts, and the black economy, where emerging technologies can be exploited for power and may lead to unintended outcomes.[83]

The primary challenge is making sure that technological progress improves transparency and does not conceal underlying democratic flaws.

B.    AI and Anti-Corruption Fiscal Oversight

A notable innovation addressing democratic neglect involves applying Artificial Intelligence (AI) to financial oversight.[84] The Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) developed a GPT-powered scoring system that automates the assessment of internal accounting controls in 219 public agencies, transforming narrative audit responses into a fiscal risk score ranging from 1 to 10.[85]

Validation showed strong reliability, with a Pearson correlation coefficient (r) of 0.71 between the AI model and expert auditors.[86] Notably, the model revealed ongoing structural differences in administrative capacity: national agencies typically scored high, averaging 8.4, while many subnational entities scored below 7.0 – about 37% of the sample – indicating higher vulnerability to fiscal risks, weaknesses in local audit capacity, and increased corruption risk.[87] This technology marks a shift from reactive to predictive oversight, offering a vital tool for mitigating the local fiscal resource curse by anticipating and preventing corruption in subnational administrations.[88]

C.   The Securitization of Tourism and Peacebuilding Narratives

Democratic governability depends on perception and controlling narratives. In the Uribe era, the Democratic Security regime increasingly securitized tourism, creating a story of territorial “reconquest” where unrestricted travel was both evidence and a way to establish a new peaceful social order.[89]

This process generated “banal geographies of security” by heavily militarizing tourist spots and their connecting routes to big cities, such as the Vive Colombia and Viaja por Ella programs.[90] This security map masked human rights violations and ongoing violence against political opponents, presenting soldiers and checkpoints as indicators of peace and stability.[91] The connection between war and tourism is mainly aimed at creating a safe environment for commerce and foreign investment, often overlooking local security concerns and the rights of vulnerable groups.[92]

In contrast, the 2016 peace process called for a new strategic communication strategy. The negotiations primarily used public relations techniques to build trust and demonstrate commitment between the government and the FARC-EP.[93] Achieving success depended on third-party mediation and both parties’ willingness to compromise and step back from adversarial tactics.[94] Community-driven initiatives, like promoting eco-agritourism in former conflict areas such as Montes de María, serve as a constructive, grassroots alternative. These efforts connect local economic empowerment and community peacebuilding with tourism branding, challenging the state-led, militarized security narrative.[95]

VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

Colombia maintains a fragile balance: a formal democracy under persistent threat. The combination of strong presidential authority, populist tendencies, and a highly divided party landscape exerts ongoing pressure for democratic regression. Nonetheless, these challenges are countered by robust institutional safeguards, such as the independent Constitutional Court, professional electoral management bodies, and new technological oversight tools.[96] The primary ongoing issue is systemic democratic delinquency, which undermines local government capacity, fosters illegal economies, and jeopardizes the progress of post-conflict security and institutional growth.[97]

Tackling this structural instability necessitates coordinated policy measures across the judicial, fiscal, and security sectors. The subsequent recommendations, grounded in empirical evidence, seek to convert Colombia’s delicate balance into a durable, liberal democratic foundation.

Policy Recommendation

A.   Enhancing Institutional Oversight and Controls Balance:

1.     Protect Judicial Independence: Ensure tenure security and appoint judges based on merit and without partisan influence to maintain the judiciary’s power to oppose unconstitutional presidential reforms.[98] The experience from the Uribe era shows that a moderate, institutional opposition, backed by a capable judiciary, is the most effective strategy to prevent executive overreach.[99]

2.     Professionalize Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs): Establish independent, non-partisan EMBs with transparent appointment procedures. The independence of these bodies is directly connected to higher electoral quality, acting as a vital safeguard against fraud and manipulation.[100]

B.    Improving Local Fiscal Accountability and Anti-Corruption:

1.     Implement AI-Driven Fiscal Strategic Oversight: Expand the GPT-based scoring system used by the CGR to cover all municipal entities.[101] Connect automated fiscal risk scores with performance-based funding to prevent the misuse of natural resource royalties and boost local accountability.[102] This approach seeks to tackle the underlying structural problems that contribute to corruption in subnational governance.

2.     Prioritize Local Tax Revenue: Policies should promote a move from depending on external natural-resource royalties to relying on locally collected property taxes.[103] This change improves accountability between local governments and citizens, leading to better delivery of public services and naturally lowering corruption incentives. It also helps to mitigate the adverse effects associated with the fiscal resource curse.[104]

3.     Reform Campaign Finance and Illicit Flows: Enforce strict bans on anonymous political donations, mandate real-time campaign expenditure reports, and give electoral and judicial bodies, like the Fiscalía, the power to investigate illicit funding actively.[105] Such reforms are essential to address the “significant distortions” caused by unregulated money in democratic competition, which frequently enables criminal influence.[106]

C.   Land Governance, Security, and Developing Peacebuilding:

1.     Implement Transparent Land Governance: Carry out rapid, thorough cadastral updates and implement land restitution policies for displaced communities.[107] At the same time, introduce progressive land taxes to reduce speculative cattle ranching and illegal land grabbing, which are major contributors to illicit economies and deforestation in ALSs.[108]

2.     Counter Local Competitive Authoritarianism (LCA): Target municipalities showing signs of LCA, like fragmentation and low voter turnout, by safeguarding social leaders and human rights defenders.[109] Shift from militarized security approaches to community policing and service initiatives that enhance government credibility and close governance gaps used by criminal groups.[110]

3.     Strategic Communication & Tourism Branding: Develop a public narrative backed by a communications strategy that recognizes the historical complexity of the conflict. It should promote community-led, peace-focused tourism and city branding, such as Medellín’s transformation story.[111] This approach contrasts with the ineffective military-style “war-tourism” that conceals structural violence.[112]

D. Addressing External and Digital Threats:

1.     Coordinate Border and Migration Policy: Establish a binational task force with Venezuela that merges shared security intelligence, humanitarian support, and economic policies for migrants.[113] Link the successful Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program with local capacity-building efforts in border cities to manage socioeconomic challenges and reduce hostile public attitudes, such as xenophobia, which are fueled by fears of crime and insecurity.[114]

2.     Encourage Digital Literacy and Media Skills Pluralism: Invest in media literacy curricula and support fact-checking organizations to counter the weaponization of political discourse online.[115] Promote balanced, conflict-sensitive media coverage to lessen hostile media perceptions and decrease affective polarization, thereby protecting the integrity of digital civic space.[116]

3.     Integrate Cyber Peacebuilding: Make sure the national digital security policies, which now focus on commercialization and economic growth, incorporate a “cyber peacebuilding” component that recognizes the conflict’s history, safeguards vulnerable online groups, and tackles human rights concerns.[117]

By integrating robust institutional protections, cutting-edge accountability tools, and focused governance in marginalized regions, Colombia possesses the essential means to halt the cycle of democratic decline and establish a sustainable, inclusive, and legitimate democratic system.[118]

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[1] Camilo Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit: Mayors, Criminal Actors, and the Deliberate Weakening of the Local State in Colombia," Comparative Political Studies 56, no. 9 (2023): 1295–1327.

[2] Juan, Juan Pablo Milanese, Inge H Valencia, and Jonas Wolff, "Local Competitive Authoritarianism and Post-Conflict Violence. An Analysis of the Assassination of Social Leaders in Colombia," International Interactions 49, no. 2 (2023): 237–67.

[3] Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit," 1296.

[4] Juan Manuel Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience," Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 48–62.

[5] Abbey Steele and Livia I Schubiger, "Democracy and civil war: The case of Colombia," Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 6 (2018): 587–600.

[6] Steele and Schubiger, "Democracy and civil war," 587.

[7] Steele and Schubiger, 592.

[8] Steele and Schubiger, 588; Mario Alberto Arria, "Judicial review of constitutional amendments in Colombia: a political and historical perspective, 1955–2016," Theory and Practice of Legislation (Oxford, England) 5, no. 3 (2017): 245–75.

[9] Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Nicolás Schmidt, and Daniela Vairo, "Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016," Democratization 26, no. 4 (2019): 606–25.

[10] Guillermo O’Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 55–69.

[11] O’Donnell, "Delegative Democracy.”

[12] O’Donnell, 60; Andreas Schedler, "Erosion as a Type of Regime Change.”

[13] Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience," 48.

[14] Santos, 50; Laura Gamboa, "Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela," Comparative Politics 49, no. 4 (2017): 457–78.

[15] Gamboa, 464; Pérez-Liñán et al., "Presidential hegemony.”

[16] Gamboa, "Opposition at the Margins," 463.

[17] Gamboa, 468; Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience," 51.

[18] Gamboa, "Opposition at the Margins," 468.

[19] Gamboa, 470–71.

[20] Gamboa, 471.

[21] Gamboa, 470, 472.

[22] Gamboa, 472; Arria, "Judicial review," 245.

[23] Gamboa, "Opposition at the Margins," 464.

[24] Gamboa, 466 23; Gamboa, 467.

[25] Gamboa, 472.

[26] Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience," 56.

[27] Tobias Franz, "Why ‘Good Governance’ Fails: Lessons from Regional Economic Development in Colombia," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43, no. 4 (2018): 642–51.

[28] Franz, 642.

[29] Franz, 642.

[30] Franz, 646–47.

[31] Juan et al., "Local Competitive Authoritarianism.”

[32] Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit," 1296.

[33] Nieto-Matiz, 1296.

[34] Nieto-Matiz, 1298.

[35] Nieto-Matiz, 1298.

[36] Nieto-Matiz, 1298.

[37] Nieto-Matiz, 1298.

[38] Martínez, "Natural Resource Rents, Local Taxes, and Government Performance: Evidence from Colombia," The Review of Economics and Statistics 107, no. 5 (2025): 1460–69.

[39] Martínez, "Natural Resource Rents," 1460.

[40] Martínez, 1460.

[41] Sarah Zukerman Daly, "How Do Violent Politicians Govern? The Case of Paramilitary-Tied Mayors in Colombia," British Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (2022): 1852–75; Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit," 1312.

[42] Kevin Casas-Zamora and Daniel Zovatto, "The Cost of Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulation in Latin America," Latin America Initiative Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS (2015): 1–19.

[43] Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 5.

[44] Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 16.

[45] Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 19.

[46] Jonathan Hartlyn, Jennifer McCoy, and Thomas M. Mustillo, "Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 73–98.

[47] Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, 75.

[48] Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, 75.

[49] Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, 83, 90.

[50] Juan et al., "Local Competitive Authoritarianism.”

[51] Juan et al., 237

[52] Juan et al., 245.

[53] Juan et al., 247.

[54] Juan et al., 251.

[55] Diana Camila Garzón‐Velandia, María Idaly Barreto‐Galeano, and José Manuel Sabucedo‐Cameselle, "When political elites talk, citizens reply. Affective polarization through temporal orientation and intergroup emotions," Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 24, no. 4 (2024): 621–44.

[56] Catalina Quinchía-Saavedra, José Alberto Castañeda García, and Juan Miguel Rey-Pino, "Tweeting for peace: an analysis of twitter use in Colombia’s peace process," International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing 22 (2025): 603–30.

[57] Quinchía-Saavedra, Castañeda García, and Rey-Pino, 603.

[58] Quinchía-Saavedra, Castañeda García, and Rey-Pino, 603.

[59] Juan Masullo and Davide Morisi, "Risks and Opportunities of Direct Democracy: The Effect of Information in Colombia’s Peace Referendum," Politics and Governance 7, no. 2 (2019): 242–67.

[60] Masullo and Morisi, 243.

[61] Masullo and Morisi, 244.

[62] Masullo and Morisi, 244, 256.

[63] Masullo and Morisi, 243.

[64] Angelika Rettberg, "Peace-Making Amidst an Unfinished Social Contract: The Case of Colombia," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 14, no. 1 (2020): 84–100.

[65] Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit," 1324.

[66] Murillo-Sandoval, P. J. Disentangling the landscape during armed conflicts and post-peace agreements: Clues from Colombia’s n/a, Integr. Environ. Assess. Manag.

[67] P.J.M.-S. et al., "The post-conflict expansion of coca farming and illicit cattle ranching in Colombia," Scientific Reports 13, no. 1965 (2023): 1–10.

[68] Martínez, "Natural Resource Rents.”

[69] John Polga-Hecimovich, "Transnational Organized Crime and the Venezuelan State," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2025).

[70] Polga-Hecimovich.

[71] Markus Hochmüller, "Urban Insecurity, Contested Governance, and Civic Resistance at the Colombia-Venezuela Border," Journal of Illicit Economies and Development 4, no. 3 (2022): 351–69.

[72] Hochmüller, 357.

[73] Hochmüller, 357.

[74] Polga-Hecimovich, "Transnational Organized Crime.”

[75] AbdiHakim Hussein and Emily Nye, "Beyond the narrative: Colombia and the Venezuelan migrants," Global Policy 15, no. Suppl. 3 (2024): 83–92.

[76] Hussein and Nye, 84.

[77] Hussein and Nye, 88.

[78] Markus Ciesielski and Ingrid Carolina Hormaza Jimenez, "Shifting perceptions or shifting attention? The local press, Venezuelan migration, and hostile perceptions in Colombia," Estudios Sobre El Mensaje Periodístico 30, no. 1 (2024): 35–47.

[79] Hussein and Nye, 88

[80] José-Rodrigo Córdoba-Pachón and Kevin Orr, "Three patterns to understand e-government: the case of Colombia," International Journal of Public Sector Management 22, no. 6 (2009): 532–54.

[81] Córdoba-Pachón and Orr, 532.

[82] [82] Córdoba-Pachón and Orr, 545.

[83] Córdoba-Pachón and Orr, 535.

[84] Ana E. Restrepo-Carmona et al., "Fiscal Management and Artificial Intelligence as Strategies to Combat Corruption in Colombia," Information 16, no. 11 (2025): 998.

[85] Restrepo-Carmona et al., 998.

[86] Restrepo-Carmona et al., 998.

[87] Restrepo-Carmona et al., 998

[88] Restrepo-Carmona et al., 998.

[89] Diana Ojeda, "War and Tourism: The Banal Geographies of Security in Colombia’s “Retaking”," Geopolitics 18, no. 4 (2013): 759–78.

[90] Ojeda, 764.

[91] Ojeda, 766.

[92] Ojeda, 766.

[93] Ivana Monnard and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, "Public relations for peacebuilding: case study from Colombia," Corporate Communications: An International Journal 25, no. 1 (2020): 48–73.

[94] Monnard and Sriramesh, 48.

[95] Ávila, 3–14.

[96] Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience.”

[97] Nieto-Matiz, "When the State Becomes Complicit," 1296.

[98] Gamboa, "Opposition at the Margins," 468.

[99] Gamboa, 472.

[100] Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, "Electoral Governance Matters," 75.

[101] Restrepo-Carmona et al., "Fiscal Management and Artificial Intelligence.”

[102] Restrepo-Carmona et al., 998.

[103] Martínez, "Natural Resource Rents," 1460.

[104] Daly, "How Do Violent Politicians Govern?" 1852.

[105] Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, "The Cost of Democracy," 16, 19.

[106] Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 16.

[107] P.J.M.-S. et al., "The post-conflict expansion of coca farming.”

[108] P.J.M.-S. et al., "The post-conflict expansion of coca farming.”

[109] Juan et al., "Local Competitive Authoritarianism.”

[110] Rettberg, "Peace-Making Amidst an Unfinished Social Contract," 9.

[111] D. Ojeda, "War and Tourism" 89; Medellín Transformation as city brand attribute.

[112] Ojeda, 768.

[113] Polga-Hecimovich, "Transnational Organized Crime.”

[114] Hussein and Nye, "Beyond the narrative.”

[115] Je, Sayre, and Rojas, "Perceptions of the Media.”

[116] Garzón‐Velandia, Barreto‐Galeano, and Sabucedo‐Cameselle, "When political elites talk.”

[117] Jean-Marie Chenou, "The contested meanings of cybersecurity: evidence from post-conflict Colombia," Conflict, Security & Development 21, no. 1 (2021): 1–19.

[118] Santos, "Colombia’s Surprising Resilience.”